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João Paulo Pessoa  and John van Reenen discuss new research into the apparently loose
relationship between wage growth and productivity growth in the UK and the US. They find that
workers as a whole are not missing out, but increasing non-wage costs and rising wage inequalities
have restricted gains.     
It is widely believed that American workers are being screwed (to use a technical economic term) by
the firms they work for. Exhibit 1 in the case for the prosecution is that real wages of the typical US
worker have hardly increased in four decades whereas labour productivity has continued to grow
steadily. In other words, the pie is growing, but capital and the very richest workers (the fabled 1 per
cent of the Occupy Movement) have eaten up all the economic goodies. Recently, it has also been
suggested that the UK is starting to follow the same unhappy path with productivity growth outpacing
wages.
Is this true? Well not really.
Have wages decoupled from productivity in the US and the UK?
The ugly label for the phenomenon of wage growth falling behind productivity growth is “decoupling”.
Basic economics teaches that workers real compensation should grow in line with per capita GDP
over the long-run. But between 1972 and 2010 American productivity grew by 84 per cent whereas
median wages grew by 8 per cent. We call this by the even uglier term “gross decoupling”. Bear with
us; you will see why we call it that. In the UK, things were also bad, but not quite so awful – the same
measure of real productivity grew by 114 per cent and median real wages by 72 per cent. So gross
decoupling was a whopping 76 percentage points in the US (84 per cent minus 8 per cent) and a
substantial 42 percentage points (114 per cent minus 72 per cent) in the UK.
Is this slam-dunk proof that the Occupy protestors are right and economists, as usual, wrong? Are
workers are being denied their fair share of economic growth?
Not so fast. What Economics 101 focuses on is “net decoupling” which is the idea that average
compensation should roughly follow GDP per hour deflated in the same way. In the UK net decoupling
is basically zero: both wages and productivity rose by the same amount since 1972. In the US, there is
a bit of net decoupling: about 13 per cent.
So what explains this massive difference between gross and net decoupling? In the UK, it is basically
two things: inequality and non-wage labour costs. First, the UK has had growing wage inequality since
1979 and this means that average wages have risen much faster than median wages (which is the
wage that separates the population in two halves, 50 per cent earning more than the median earner
and 50 per cent earning less). Secondly, non-wage labour costs such as pensions and healthcare
benefits have risen very quickly. These are all part of what is called “compensation”, which is what
employers care about, not just the direct cost of paying salaries.
The US has experienced even larger increases in inequality and non-wage labour costs than the UK,
and these two account for about half of the gross decoupling between productivity and wages in the
US. But in addition there is a growing divergence between the GDP deflator and the consumer price
deflator with the GDP price deflator rising much more slowly than measured consumer prices. This isn’t
true in Britain where both measures of inflation track each other quite closely. No one has quite figured
out why this is, but it is probably related to the fact that the price of information and communication
technology (ICT) related investment goods (servers, networks, enterprise software and the like) have
fallen faster than measured consumer price of ICT goods. Improved measurement of consumer prices
tends to bring the two deflators more into line – some consumer price measures reduce the deflator
contributor of decoupling from 30 per cent to only 6 per cent and so substantially reduce the degree of
gross decoupling in the US.
Breaking it all down
All this can be seen in Figure 1 below which is for the UK between 1972 and 2010. “Gross decoupling”
was 42 per cent but net decoupling (the blue bar) was -0.8 per cent. The white bar is the contribution of
wage inequality (a 15 per cent contribution) and the horizontally hatched bar are “benefits” (a 17.5 per
cent contribution), the difference between wages and compensation. This explains almost all of the
divergence between gross and net decoupling.
Figure 1: What explains Gross Decoupling (the difference between GDP per hour deflated by
GDP deflator and median wages deflated by CPI)
Decomposition in the UK, 1972-2010
Notes: Each bar is the contribution of the different elements accounting for gross decoupling in the UK
(the fast that GDP per hour deflated by the GDP deflator grew by 42% more than the growth of median
wages deflated by the CPI.
Source: “Decoupling of Wage Growth and Productivity Growth? Myth and Reality” by João Paulo
Pessoa and John Van Reenen, Centre for Economic Performance
Another check on this is to look at the labour share of national income. Labour’s share has basically
been constant in the UK which is consistent with our analysis (see Figure 2). If average compensation
had really grown much more slowly than productivity, the share of profits in GDP would have risen a lot
and the share of labour would have fallen. Although there is variation over the business cycle, it the
share of income going to the working class is basically the same now as it was 40 years ago.
Interestingly, there is more of a fall in the labour share of income in Continental EU nations and Japan,
so there might be evidence of capitalists doing a lot better than workers in these nations whereas
workers have done relatively better in the US and UK!
Figure 2: The share of Labour Costs in total GDP, 1972-2020 in the UK
Notes: This is the share of labour costs in GDP.
Source: OECD
Policy Implications
In terms of policy, the decoupling debate has shed more heat than light. Our results suggest that net
decoupling is essentially a myth and cannot be used to justify redressing the overall balance between
wages and profits. The real problem is inequality among employees – wage inequality has risen
massively since the late 1970s and this is a real problem. In the US the share of income of the top 1%
was higher than it had been for a century, about the same as 1928 just prior to the Wall Street crash
that ushered in the Great Depression and World War II. But understanding the causes of wage
inequality is exactly where economics has focused on over the last 20 years (see, for example, John
Van Reenen (2011) “Wage, Inequality, Technology and Trade: 21st Century”). Fundamentally, rapid
technological change and the integration of low wage economies like China and India into the global
economy has massively increased the relative demand for more skilled workers. Improving the quantity
and quality of skills for people in the bottom half of the education distribution must be the main priority
for policy makers in the UK and US. This will boost productivity and real wages.
For further details of this article see “Decoupling of Wage Growth and Productivity Growth? Myth and
Reality” by João Paulo Pessoa and John Van Reenen, Centre for Economic Performance
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You may also be interested in the following posts (automatically generated):
1. Arguments linking a lower corporation tax to increased productivity and growth have no basis in
reality
2. Poorly targeted short term initiatives to revive the UK’s flagging growth rates are likely to make
things worse. Consistency in economic policy is key in delivering long-term growth.
3. Plan B is the wrong rhetoric, but the Treasury must spell out a strategic vision for the UK’s
economic growth
4. The government’s economic policy ignores the gendered effects of its ‘competitive’ growth
strategy
